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FEATURE

ARTICLE

The Reconstruction of LegalEconomic Relations:
Achieving Workable Competition
by Peter C. Carstensen
Health care illustrates one of the funda- of the subsidy fund in fact never actually subsimental themes of Neil Komesar's recent book, dizes the care of others, but rather is diverted
Imperfect Alternatives': if one institutional strat- into the hands of participants in health care proegy for implementing public policy presents se- vision.4 Thus the dysfunctions of the health care
rious problems, then it is highly likely that any system's methods of paying for care is demonother institutional approach is also going to be strated by the amount and pervasiveness of disvery imperfect. Basic goals for health care are counts that specific groups of consumers are able
the subject of substantial public consensus. As a to wring from providers.
In these deregulatory times, the general
nation, it is important that all citizens have access to good health care regardless of their abil- thrust of public policy is to rely more on market
ity to pay. The problem lies in achieving that institutions to create the appropriate pricing and
goal in a manner consistent with economic effi- allocation of health care services.5 Taking into
ciency, cost minimization, and the retention of account the preference for market-based strateideological and social aspects of the current sys- gies it would be a complete failure to expand the
role of health care markets constrained only by
tem.
At present, health care policy is imple- general application of antitrust law. Even worse
mented through a mix of market and political would be the expansion of health care markets
(administrative) institutions. The resulting health that are unconstrained as a result of broad excare system is economically inefficient and fails emptions from antitrust law in order to facilitate
to accomplish its fundamental goal of providing agreements and combinations among such proall people with adequate health care, despite its viders. Consumers cannot obtain reasonably
obvious capacity to do so. 2 The majority of health priced health care services for themselves, nor
care consumers are overcharged for the services distribute the cost of supporting health care for
they personally receive.' The price includes a those unable to pay in an efficient manner withsubsidy for some of those receiving health care out a more fundamental rethinking and redefiniwho cannot afford to pay for such
services or whose agent (state or
ProfessorC.arstensenis theArthur-Bascom Professorof Law
federal government) refuses to
andAssoci ate Deanfor Researchand FacultyDevelopment
pay. Yet such a subsidy is itself
at the University of Wisconsin Law School. Priorto joining
very inefficiently organized and
the University of Wisconsin faculty, Professor Carstensen
implemented in that it often taxes
was a trial attorney at the Antitrust Division of the United
those of limited means to aid
States Dep artment ofJustice.ProfessorCarstensenreceived
those of substantial means,
his B.A. frtom the University of Wisconsin and his M.A. in
Moreover, a significant amount
economics and LL.B. from Yale University.
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tion of the highly flawed markets and administrative fiefdoms that have evolved in this industry.
This thesis has two elements. First, coherent and productive policy analysis requires
an understanding of the recent transformation of
personal health care in historical terms. This
transformation evolves from a very marginal
activity in terms of its social value into a highly
valued, but costly, service which has retained a
system for payment and an economic organization that maximizes the inherent difficulties in
achieving efficient and equitable economic behavior. Second, this historical understanding of
the dysfunctional nature of health care payments
and organization provides the basis to identify
the reforms in the basic legal conditions under
which these markets operate. Such reforms will
greatly enhance the potential that competitive
processes, as governed by active antitrust oversight, and will yield better results for consumers
both as recipients of health care and as the ultimate payers for such services.
The transformation of medicine
The nature of health care for individuals6 has changed dramatically in the last few decades. As recently as the 1930s and early 1940s,
doctors were largely diagnosticians who could
tell most patients what was going to happen, but
could do little to change the outcome in the vast
majority of those cases.7 Hospitals were places
people visited to be cared for while natural processes worked themselves out and the patient
either lived or died. Due to the patient's uncertainty concerning the outcome, the costs associated with individual health care were very modest. Having a low expectation of success, pa-
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tients had little incentive to spend more.8
Of course, there were exceptions. After
the start of the 20th century, people began to
spend more on their health care, especially as to
certain simple surgical procedures, vaccinations,
and other treatments involving limited technological and biological sophistication.9 During
that time medicine presumably offered more useful and valuable responses in the cases of accidental injury. Interestingly, workers compensation laws uniformly imposed the entire cost of
health care and a substantial part of the lost wages
related to industrial accidents (by far the largest
source of injury in those pre-automobile days),
on the employer regardless of the unionization
of employees or any other indicia of their bargaining power. 0 This allocation of cost and responsibility for treatment of accidents is strongly
associated with the rapid decline of injury and
death in the workplace and the systematic development of medical science to reduce the harms
associated with those injuries that did occur."
Still, for most illnesses, medicine could only differentiate the symptoms and predict the outcome.
As such, it contributed little of social or economic
12
value and was compensated accordingly.
The transformation of health care over
the last five decades is truly profound. Starting
in the 1930s and 40s, the discovery of antibiotics, the development of x-rays, and the unraveling of many central biological facts about disease have lead to a genuine revolution in the role
of medicine in the lives of people. 13 Technology, pharmacology, diagnostic techniques and
medical treatments, including transplants and
complex surgery, have made an enormous difference in the role of doctors, hospitals and medical treatment.14 With greatly increasing frequency, doctors can tell patients not only what
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will happen if a condition is allowed to persist,
but also what can be done to ameliorate or cure
the condition. Indeed, today medical science
often has the capacity to sustain biological life
well past the point at which any human or humane interest is served.
The economic implications of this scientific transformation are manifest. Demand for
health care has grown exponentially as it now
offers substantive improvements in the life and
well being of the patient. Such care is often costly
and as a result of its changed character the total
costs of health care have risen. 5 Whereas prior
to 1940, demand for health care was naturally
limited by its own ineffectiveness, today no such
constraint exists and increased supply at increased cost will ultimately alter the health situation of many individuals. This dynamic has
changed, and is still changing, the overall economic context of health care markets.
In terms of human experience, this transformation has occurred at revolutionary speed.
Our ideas and social, as well as ethical, responses
take generations to adjust to changed scientific
realities. Thus, there are enormous problems of
how to relate many of the new capacities of medical science to the human condition. For example,
the end of life for those terminally ill is increasingly a conscious choice of doctors, patient, and
family; yet, our social and ethical norms have
not clearly accepted or adapted to this dramatic
technological change.
A coherent analysis of the current problems in paying for health care has to start from
an appreciation of the technical history briefly
summarized in this thesis. Only if people can
appreciate that the very nature of the health care
being demanded today is radically different from
what it was only a few decades ago can we un-
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derstand how finance and technology have gotten out of step with each other.
The dysfunctional character of health
care payments
How the people of the United States pay
for their health is the central economic factor in
the difficulties currently experienced by the overall health care system. 6 The system has the capacity and the revenue to provide adequate health
care for all citizens. 7 Nonetheless costs continue to increase and many people do not, in fact,
have access to health care. 18
Which consumer pays, what they pay,
and how they pay, strongly influences the points
at which choices occur regarding the services
provided and how the resulting funds will be allocated among those providing services. The payments system can facilitate or frustrate general
access and equal treatment for consumers. Similarly, the system can encourage or discourage
self-seeking, strategic economic behavior by
participants.
For reasons of politics and social values,
the United States did not develop a system of
public, national health care as most other countries have.' 9 At the same time, there has been
and continues to be a general recognition that all
citizens should have access to competent health
care services.2' Consequently, individuals with
the financial capacity to do so paid more for their
own and their families health care directly or
through indemnity insurance (i.e., insurance that
reimbursed for specific costs) than the "actual"
CoSt. 2' These individual transactions created a
market context in which sellers had a great deal
of opportunity to vary prices among buyers. Indeed, in order to finance the provision of health

• 155

care for all, it was essential that providers charge
prices to some customers substantially above cost
in order to have sufficient revenue to cover the
costs, especially fixed costs, necessary to provide services to those who were unable to pay
the full or even part of the cost. 22 Moreover, in
individual transactions, the buyer had little bargaining power and even less knowledge of the
value or comparative prices of the services rendered. As a small item in the budget, it was also
not worthwhile for individuals to become sophisticated in valuing health care or seeking alternatives.
This privately operated system to subsidize the costs of the medically indigent was a
plausible solution for this country where the ideology of individualism and anti-statism was
strong and the total costs of individual health care
were limited. As a historical matter, it is doubtful that either state or federal government would
have had the administrative competency to operate a general health care system until well into
the 20th Century, or that the value of individual
health care warranted any real concern about the
payments system. This strategy of private taxation and subsidization unreviewed and unregulated does, of course, contain great potential for
inefficiency and misallocation of resources. In
addition, this approach limited the capacity of
consumers, each paying a small tax to cover the
costs of others, to consider the allocation of or
access to services being provided, or to demand
more efficient delivery of such services.
In this same period, virtually every state
adopted legislation reconstructing the payment
for medical and other expenses associated with
industrial accidents-an area of medical care in
which real progress had already been made.23
Workers compensation imposed 100% of the
156 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

costs of health care as well as a substantial part
24
of the resulting lost wages on the employer.
Focusing the costs on the employer also meant
that the employer stood to gain economically if
the number of accidents declined and/or if their
costs and long term harmfulness were reduced.
Insurers and employers developed a strong interest in industrial safety and industrial medicine
both of which reduced the incidence, costs and
harms of such accidents. 25 Moreover, the system of payment directly supported the achievement of these goals by defining relationships in
which the parties having control and paying the
bills also stood to gain from improvements in
employee health. The gains were reflected back
in a way that created for most employers direct
economic incentives to reduce risks and to favor
more effective medical treatment. Thus, incentives were aligned and, the gains to be expected
26
from opportunistic behavior were reduced.
In contrast, with respect to general health
care, the dispersed payments system denied to
any group the capacity to be an effective consumer. Hospitals sponsored insurance systems
designed largely to organize payments for their
operating expenses without regard to the poten27
tial for catastrophic risks that individuals faced.
These plans expanded to include routine medical care. 8 Such plans allowed the insured to
average out ordinary medical expenses and to
have them paid with pre-tax dollars to the extent that such plans were fringe benefits. 29 In
addition, especially as the capacity to treat serious diseases and injuries increased, the problems
of catastrophically large expenses and the problem of long-term expensive support lead to additional kinds of insurance largely focused on
indemnifying patients for expenses. 30 The problem of aged and medically indigent groups lead
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to separate schemes-Medicare and Medicaid.
Both systems used taxes to fund some or all of
the necessary health care. 3
Because these routes to compensate
health care costs of different groups arose and
developed separately, the problems of transferring costs has been made even greater.32 Each
group or the party paying health care costs receives an advantage if they can lower their own
direct costs for health care even if the total direct health care costs incurred by the system remain constant. Of course, such cost shifting is
likely to inflate the overall administrative costs,
but from the standpoint of any particular group
the extra administrative costs are worth incurring if they result in a greater offsetting lowering of direct costs. In addition, health care providers have a substantial economic stake in ensuring that their own revenues and profits remain
high. Hence, they can and do claim that cost
transfers support the system when a primary
impact is to protect the income of particular
groups or classes of providers.33
As the costs of health care have increased,
the transfers among groups have had to increase
substantially. 34 Although the public has, through
Medicare and Medicaid, undertaken greater direct payment, those systems have employed government power to impose cost transfers to other
health care consumers as Congress became reluctant to pay the full cost of the care being demanded from the system.35 This is economically
inefficient and counter-productive, but it is politically attractive since the transfers imposed to
support public access are imposed in the form of
private insurance charges or higher direct payments required of solvent customers, rather than
as direct taxes imposed on the general public.
This payment process also disperses
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power in a way that makes control over costs
and service very difficult. 36 No one entity is paying for the full cost, and many who pay have no
clear idea that they are paying. The necessary
consequence is that each actor takes an interest
in those costs that it can control. Government
cuts its contribution to health care costs but insists that all receive care. 38 Private actors, especially when organized as group purchasers, insist on special deals. 39 Employers limit their contribution. Because the direct costs of providing
specific services are often much below the quoted
price (i.e., the price needed to generate total revenues sufficient to cover total costs), there is a
wide margin for negotiation over price and no
generally accepted method of cost accounting
provides unambiguous guidance as to reasonable
cost assignment.
In the last two decades, group plans of
various kinds have emerged as major buyers of
and providers of health care.' Once again, these
groups exist within a market system in which
buyers negotiate individual prices. The major
difference is that groups control large amounts
of purchasing power and have the capacity and
economic stake to bargain for prices as well as
services.4 Thus, once again we observe price
differences, often dramatic, between what doctors, hospitals, and drug companies charge for
the same service depending on who is paying
for that service.42
Legal conditions frustrating workable
competition
Assuming market institutions are to be
the primary vehicle for reorganizing and reforming health care, it is essential to give serious attention to the basic legal conditions which de-
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fine how these markets can and will operate including how these conditions interact with each
other and with the technological and economic
conditions that define the markets to create the
dysfunctions in their ultimate performance. My
suggestion is that some of the legal conditions
constituting health care that make socially useful economic competition improbable are amendable to reform. Others, however, inhere in the
basic demand for modem health care and the
technical and social constraints within which
society provides and expects health care. Only
when the socially and legally malleable conditions that define health care are reformulated to
create a context favorable to workable competition can the market process carry out the social
and economic obligations policy makers have
assigned to it. After this kind of basic reform has
occurred, it is then worth asking what role antitrust law should play in the reconstituted health
care market context.43 But even then, it is essential that we recognize that the results will be less
than perfect.
Two recent cases illustrate important,
dysfunctional legal conditions within which
health care markets operate. These illustrations
also demonstrate that the dysfunctional conditions that define relationships in health care operate on both the supply and demand side of the
process.
The first illustration is Austin v. Mercy
Health Systems,' this recent decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals involving a hospital that
redefined the privileges of doctors on its staff in
ways that limited their practice.45 The hospital's
board decreed that doctors lacking a specific credential could not treat patients in its Intensive
Care Unit ("ICU"), a major profit center for the
hospital.' Not surprisingly, a staff employee of
158 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

the hospital had such a credential, thus giving
the hospital control over and billing rights for all
ICU patients because the doctors affiliated with
any competing organizations lacked anyone who
had such a credential and had privileges in this
hospital. 47 The excluded doctors successfully
contended that the hospital had violated terms
of its contract with them by reducing their rights
to treat and bill patients admitted to the hospital
(the hosptial's bylaws on privileges constituted
the contract). The court concluded that the trial
court incorrectly granted the hospital's motion
to dismiss. The court ruled that the doctor's had
come forth with sufficient evidence so that a jury
could find the hospital committed a tortious interference with economic advantage which
caused the doctors to suffer a loss of position in
their community.' The court remanded the issue back to the trial court for determination on
the merits. 49
The doctors challenged the hospital's use
of its own, self-created, manpower plan as the
basis to determine whether or not new doctors
would be granted privileges. 0 Under this "plan"
the hospital granted privileges to its own staff
physicians but refused to accord access to doctors proposed by the rival HMO." In addressing
this issue court upheld the right of the hospital
to refuse access to qualified doctors if those doctors did not fit with the hospital's "plan" for the
52
use of its facilities.
Under Austin, while rights of existing
doctors were protected, the court gave doctors
no rights to control future grants of privileges in
the hospital.53 Moreover, under this holding the
hospital is both a direct economic competitor of
a substantial segment of the local medical community and in this case provides the only hospital services in the community.5 4 The predictable
Volume 8, number 2

consequence of defining the basic rights of the
parties in this way is that new entry and new competition is made harder. This occurs because access to the hospital, an essential element of complete medical service, is made more difficult. At
the same time established doctors from the competing group have a special position in the existing market. The rights created provide strong
incentives for the competing groups to agree on
terms that exclude new competition and allocate
wealth among the existing practitioners. In sum,
the basic rights defined and recognized by the
courts will make it very difficult to challenge
exclusionary decisions.
Within 11 days of the Wisconsin decision, the United States Antitrust Division commenced proceedings against doctors and hospitals in Danbury, Connecticut and St. Joseph,
Missouri, charging them with collaborating to
create a price fixing scheme and to exclude new
entry at either level.55 The New York Times, citing unnamed experts, reported that more cases
like [these will] ... emerge as health-care professionals struggle to defend their fees and control over medical services.56 The nature of the
rights conferred on hospitals to exclude new doctors based on self-defined manpower plans will
greatly influence how successful these struggles
will be since antitrust law can only reach the most
egregious and conspicuous violations.
Similarly, in late April 1995, the United
States Supreme Court gave its blessing to large
scale, state sponsored price discrimination in
hospital services in New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.57 The issue in Blue Cross was
whether ERISA's pre-emption of state law relating to employee benefit plans defeated the New
York statute which imposed up to 24% price in1995-1996

creases on all health insurers and HMOs, including those that administered health care plans for
employers.58 Only Blue Cross plans were exempt, and some of the price increases went to
the hospitals while some portion went to the state.
The Court correctly held that under ERISA these
surcharges did not relate to employee benefit
plans within the meaning of the statute.59 The
goal of these charges was to tax one set of health
insurance plans for the benefit of the hospitals.'
The state and federal government were forcing
hospitals to take lower payments for patients on
Medicare and Medicaid in order to protect the
Blues from price competition because the Blues
had open enrollment for all individuals. Moreover, the state wanted to reimburse itself for some
of its health care costs.6

To justify this state interference in employee benefit plans otherwise protected by
ERISA, the Court necessarily had to take the
position that rate variationsamong hospital providers are accepted examples of cost variation,
since hospitals have traditionally attempted to
compensate for their financial shortfalls by adjusting their price.., schedules for patients with
commercial health insurers. 62 For the Court to
consider price discrimination (rate variations)
examples of cost variation 63 is highly disingenuous, assuming the Court truly understood the
meaning of the terms examples of cost variation. The cost of hospital care depends on the
physical condition of the patient and not on the
identity of the insurer. But to maintain the historic system of subsidy, it is necessary to impose
higher prices on some users so that sufficient
revenue emerges to cover the total costs of the
operation. The Court's decision in Blue Cross
operates to validate the "traditional" system of
price differences for the same services which in
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turn tends to reinforce the discretionary power
of the price setter in any market with less than
perfect information and transferability.
The foregoing cases illustrate how the
way in which health care rights are defined structure the context within which any market activity will occur. The conditions for workable competition require that informed buyers be able to
purchase essentially fungible goods or services
from multiple sellers. In such a market, price will
approximate cost, and all producers will remain
under continuous pressure to improve the quality and lower the relative price of the items sold.
This occurs because buyers realize they can make
informed choices among options and variations
in the products being sold. Moreover, if the price
differences that emerge are not clearly related to
the relative value of different alternatives, buyers will switch from the more costly to the less
costly option.
Contemporary American health care markets diverge very substantially from such a
model. 64 First, the ultimate consumers, the patients, are generally not well informed, nor are
they capable of developing and processing the
necessary information, even if it were available.65
Furthermore, the patients are not likely to pay in
an easily and directly discernable way for the
choices they have made.' The costs and skills
needed to do the job would not be worth the potential gains any one consumer might realize,
especially in a world in which choices are constrained and frequently subject to major subsidy
obligations.
Second, health care is basically a personal
service, thus health care is very hard to transfer
beyond the initial buyer through any market process. Transferability is very helpful in ensuring
relatively equal prices among roughly similar
160 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

options because a favored buyer can resell to disfavored buyers. The potential for substitution
imposes a very significant limit on sellers-essentially they are required to charge roughly similar prices to all buyers. Conversely, lack of transferability greatly aids sellers in varying their
prices among buyers because a buyer who gets a
low price can not resell the service. Furthermore
the inherent non-transferability of basic health
care service is made worse because the law imposes limits on transfer of health-related commodities. For example, a retail pharmacy cannot resell prescription drugs that it obtains at a
discount to another retail pharmacy.67 This makes

price differentiation among buyers easier and less
vulnerable to break down.
Another important factor in health care
is that the majority of costs incurred at all levels
do not vary directly with the number of patients
served.6 8 In economic terms, there are very high

fixed costs relative to variable costs. Even those
items usually thought of as variable such as the
number of staff or hours worked are less flexible
in the case of health care. Systems exist to serve
some expected level of demand. Reducing demand does not change many of the costs involved. Moreover, most systems can handle increases in demand without incurring substantial
expenses so long as the increase is insubstantial.
The disjuncture between general operating costs
and the out-of-pocket costs of particular patient
services creates the potential for large scale price
discrimination. Particular costs are rarely patient
specific. 69 Hence, it is rational to take a more
global view from the provider perspective and
consider whether total revenues, however derived, are reasonably related to total costs.
Further complicating the pricing system
is the wide discretion necessarily given to phy-
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sicians to determine the tests and procedures that
they will employ. If each item is separately
priced, then the party deciding on the array of
things to be done to or for the patient has discretion both to select from among alternatives those
which have better revenue implications, and to
employ more or less tests or procedures, or vary
the time or place, if that has income implications.
A closely related problem is that the beneficiary of health care rarely pays directly for
such care. 70 When any employer or the government pays, this creates divergent interests. The
payer wants to lower costs, but the beneficiary
does not get an economic benefit tied directly to
cost savings. If all individuals and families purchased health care directly, then choosing lower
cost options would translate into visible savings.
A final issue that distinguishes health care
is that quality-control concerns are very great and
no easy way to police those issues exists. It has
not proven feasible to inspect work as is done on
production lines to see if a standard of quality is
adhered to. Malpractice claims are costly and
complex and so do not reach many kinds of quality problems.7' Similarly, licensure and state
regulation has not proven very effective in identifying or removing even very poor quality performance.7 2 The traditional solution has been to
authorize hospitals to determine which doctors
can use the facility. 73 Because access to a hospital is usually important to a physician, staff privileges became a means to police quality of professional services.
However, as hospitals increasingly become parts of integrated organizations that sell
comprehensive medical services and provide
services to the community at large, this power
creates great strategic leverage to force doctors
to make choices, even unwillingly and to limit
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the capacity of new service providers. In fact,
vertical integration through the hospital stage
creates serious market problems as Mercy Health
Systems illustrates.74
Reforming legal conditions to achieve
more workable competition
Achieving major changes in the legal
conditions defining health care will be very difficult politically because of the powerful vested
interests in the existing allocation of market positions including legal rights. 75 As Professor
Komesar has wisely observed, the failure of one
institutional system is likely to parallel that in
others. 76 The economic power of vested interests translates into political power in administrative and legislative forums. Hence, the choice
between markets and a political-administrative
strategy confronts policy makers with the identical problem of minoritarian bias which neither institution can avoid very effectively. This
is particularly pointed when it is necessary for
the political system to act to reform the legal
structure of markets so that the markets can op77
erate more effectively.
The central reforms are in redefining
what is sold and to whom it is sold. What is sold
needs to be made as standard as possible. Health
care needs can be divided into three components.
First, the amount of routine care that individuals
need fluctuates from year-to-year and exhibits
long term trend lines showing high use early and
late in lives, but averages out over any period of
years for individuals or families.78 A second component involves catastrophic expenses usually
involving a serious illness or accident. This risk
is relatively low; thus relatively few people ac79
tually experience such very high expenses.
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Here, the need is for an indemnity type of insurance policy in which all potential victims pool
their risk and agree to pay off the costs of whomever in the group suffers the loss. A related catastrophic expense arises from long term disability requiring substantial maintenance expenses.
The risks here probably increase with age, but
remain only probable costs rather than certain
ones.80 Once again, one can look at risk pooling
and risk sharing as appropriate ways to handle
such risks. Whether one product or three are
mandated to cover these needs is not important.
What is important is that relatively fixed and
comprehensive policies to cover these needs be
defined as the way in which health care is to be
sold. This implies a single price for all customers taking a particular plan from a vendor although it might be rational to vary prices based
on broad general characteristics of the population such as age or family status which are related to expected group costs.
All individuals and families would be
required to select a comprehensive plan(s) for
their health protection, and vendors could not
refuse to sell at their established prices based on
risk or other adverse characteristics. So long as
a vendor achieved a substantial number of sales
it would have a relatively random set of the population so that its risks based on individual characteristics of high and low costs should net out."
Efficiency and effectiveness in providing for
health care itself would be central to profits.
The advantage of a defined package of
services to buyers is that buyers now need much
less information to evaluate options. By holding substantial elements constant, buyers can
focus on price and specific means by which services will be provided, e.g., HMO, PPO, individual selection of physician. Thus, it should be
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possible to offer consumers real choice within a
framework of mandated coverage requirements
so that the election is among socially useful alternatives. Meanwhile, vendors who represent
large groups of buyers have strong incentives to
examine and analyze all relevant data about costs
and values. The vendor stands to make increased
profits if it can find ways to lower the incidence
of illness or accidents among its random set of
the population or if it can find ways to reduce
the cost of treatment. In a competitive market,
the cost savings will ultimately inure to the benefit of the customers because competition will
force the passing on of these savings. State or
federal government agents charged with providing health care for sub-sets of the population
would only have to have them sign up with an
appropriate plan and pay the costs.
This can not be a voluntary system because each individual is better off economically
if he or she does not share in the costs of the
system but only seeks the advantage of the benefit. For this reason, a coercive system of participation with respect to those benefits that all
desire is required. By imposing the burden on
each individual and family to buy such insurance
the gains from efficiency are reallocated to the
parties with the greatest stake in their own health
care. They get direct cost reduction as a reward
for taking less costly options. Even those being
subsidized can be given a comparable incentive
if they are allowed to retain all or even part of
the savings that result from making lower cost
selections. A simple withholding requirement
on wages and dividends with the funds flowing
to a special health care account will make this
system enforceable with respect to those who are
employed, have income from most kinds of investments or receive public or private pensions.
Volume 8, number 2

Creating standard products available to
all customers still requires information to make
markets work effectively: better information is
needed about prices both of inputs (drugs, hospital services, etc.) and of the competing packages. Accumulating information, however, is
difficult to accomplish without creating negative
side effects. Too much information, too soon
from market actors can facilitate price stabilization rather than competition. Still, buyers of
health services (inputs) need to know what prices
have been. A modest lag to allow the information to lose its immediacy will provide a useful
basis for informing future actions.
In addition, rights to inputs need to be
made as transferable as is feasible. If a hospital
or HMO gets a favorable price on a drug, it should
be free to resell that drug to other lawful users.
Similarly, if a group such as an HMO or PPO
gets favorable terms for hospital access, it should
be permitted to resell, at a profit, those rights
(sub-license them) to others seeking to place
patients in that same hospital. Such transactions
make sense economically, when seen on the
group level and focused on inputs. Similarly,
statutes mandating price discrimination in favor
of or against particular users should be eliminated. If transfer payments are required, they
should be raised via taxes and paid out as direct
subsidy. This is more efficient and provides a
clearer picture of what is being spent on the provision of such services.
For such a change in the provision of
health care finance to achieve real success requires that some other aspects of market organization change as well. In particular, the hospital
must be reformed. The hospital is a bottleneck
which can control a great deal of competition in
health care. Several solutions might be consid1995-1996

ered all of which involve limiting the bottleneck
power of hospitals. The right to use hospital facilities could be awarded by a third party. Hospitals themselves could be redefined in a common carrier way, i.e., the hospital must lease or
provide space to any properly licensed group or
individual doctor wanting to use its facilities. A
third possibility is to convert hospital ownership
into cooperative ventures which own all hospitals in a region. Health care providers in turn
would have ownership interests and could collectively shape the "system". The goal is to create a large system of hospitals with many owners whose only benefit from participation is efficient service. This implies that the right of participation must be open to all existing and new
entrants into health care in the area. This also
implies that quality control concerns have to be
located elsewhere in the health care system.
Experience in grain marketing and other agricultural cooperatives as well as electric power
transmission suggest that at least if there is a large
membership, such cooperative enterprises operate to eliminate the bottleneck effects.82
The marginal role of antitrust law in
restructuring legal conditions
The analysis presented here is that if
workable competition is to be the central basis
for producing efficient and effective health care
delivery, then the primary focus of attention has
to be on the conditions, amendable to legal reform, which currently make competition difficult. Fundamental change in legal conditions that
constitute the market must occur. Only after such
fundamental change, is it reasonably likely that
we can achieve workably competitive markets.
Antitrust law basically polices markets
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as they exist. It provides rules to deter and punish misconduct within the market and certain
major structures and changes in structure. It can
only indirectly alter the conditions under which
those markets operate. 83 Moreover, such alteration of basic conditions can only be on a caseby-case basis using antitrust. This process is very
slow and very unlikely to be effective in health
care markets. Antitrust standing alone is a negative. It forbids certain kinds of structures and
conduct. It does not and can not command
changes in current legal rights in markets.8 4 Experience gained in enforcing antitrust law is quite
relevant in guiding and informing the discussion
about how to change the basic conditions under
which health care markets operate.85 Also relevant are models of industrial organization and
experience gained in the deregulatory process in
various industries. 86 Once again, the focus of
reform has to be as in other market transforming
actions on developing and implementing a strategy that defines the legal conditions and rela-
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